Revisiting medicalization: a critique of the assumptions of what counts as medical knowledge by Correia, T.
September 2017 | Volume 2 | Article 141
ConCeptual analysis
published: 19 September 2017
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2017.00014
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org
Edited by: 
Nicola Kay Gale, 




University of Portsmouth, 
United Kingdom  
Rachel Thwaites, 






This article was submitted 
to Medical Sociology, 






Correia T (2017) Revisiting 
Medicalization: A Critique of the 
Assumptions of What Counts 
As Medical Knowledge. 
Front. Sociol. 2:14. 
doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2017.00014
Revisiting Medicalization: a Critique 
of the assumptions of What Counts 
as Medical Knowledge
Tiago Correia*
School of Sociology and Public Policies, ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal
The concept of medicalization is hugely influential, and empirical studies have demon-
strated that medicalization has largely been achieved not only through the work of 
medical professionals or scientists but also increasingly through the efforts of patients 
or citizens seeking to legitimize their distress through defining it as a “medical” problem. 
In this article, I argue that the concept of medicalization is still fundamentally important 
to the sub-discipline of medical sociology, but that there is a need to revisit and critique 
its conceptualization. I draw on reflexive arguments within the literature that we, as 
sociologists, have tended to reproduce the assumptions of the medical profession about 
what counts as medical knowledge and practice and on literature that explores the 
complex and plural ways in which people seek to make sense of their illnesses. I argue 
that there have been few attempts to engage with the question of how “making things 
medical” occurs in a global context of medical pluralism. By revisiting Conrad’s approach 
to defining medicalization, I argue for a separation between empirical observations of 
the dominance of biomedical knowledge, from theoretical observations about medical 
knowledge and definitions. I argue for a “knowledge-based” approach to medicalization 
by opening up the definition of “making things medical” to include all forms of medical 
knowledge in a global society. The concept of medicalization can then be replaced with 
medicalizations (plural). To argue this, I take two steps: first, I draw on hermeneutic 
philosophy to argue that there is a stable definition of medicine on which to base an 
argument that apparently diverse forms of medical practice can be grouped together 
and used within the concept of medicalization; second, I argue that medicalization is 
not unproblematically linked to medical social control. The “success” or not of differ-
ent attempts to define things as medical problems in part depends on the social and 
political context. This new approach allows sociologists to make sense theoretically of 
differences we see in comparative empirical research between whether “diseases” are 
acknowledged in different national or cultural context. Finally, I provide the readers with 
guidance on the operationalization of this concept in empirical study.
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intRoDuCtion
The concept of medicalization in sociology originated within a particular societal—political— 
historical context characterized by the dominance of professionalized (bio)medicine. The concept 
describes the processes and effects of medicine’s link to social regulation and control. Over time, the 
concept often became used to articulate a normative position of defense or criticism of medical power 
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in relation to lay users, other health professionals, and regulators 
(Rose, 1994). Furthermore, attempts to adapt the concept to the 
complexity of contemporary societies has resulted in growing 
attention to “co-evolving processes” (Williams et  al., 2017, p. 
778) rather than to medicalization itself, as illustrated through 
concepts, such as biomedicalization (Clarke et  al., 2010), and 
CAMization (Almeida, 2012). The first addresses the way techno-
scientific knowledge is changing the definition of life and the role 
of medicine in the enhancement of biological selves. The second 
describes the process through which complementary and alterna-
tive medicines act in western societies as countervailing forces in 
the attempt to gain socio-political and scientific legitimacy before 
the state, clients, and clinicians (see also Kelner et al., 2006).
Despite this proliferation of related concepts, recent debate 
has argued for the continued relevance of the concept of 
medicalization to the sociology of health and illness (Busfield, 
2017, Williams et al., 2017). The discussion on the medicaliza-
tion–demedicalization boundary (e.g., Conrad and Schneider, 
1980; Riessman, 1983; Burke, 2011; Halfmann, 2012) is a useful 
example of its relevance, but it also illustrates the extent to which 
a proper discussion of what counts as medical and non-medical 
is lacking in the debate despite the overall understanding that 
medical knowledge is adaptive [think of preventive, predictive, 
personal, and participatory medicine (Hofmann, 2016)].
It is with these ideas in mind that I introduce in this article 
a knowledge-based critique of medicalization. This approach 
makes a link to the perspectives in hermeneutical philosophy 
on the conceptualization of medicine. I seek to demonstrate the 
ongoing value of the concept of medicalization in sociological 
analysis and demonstrate that its use can be analytically neutral 
(less normative) in relation to different players and the nature of 
medical knowledge. To make this argument, I revisit the work of 
Peter Conrad. The focus on Conrad does not ignore that the term 
“medicalization” has been differently used among sociologists 
since the late 60s [see Busfield (2017) for an overview of these 
differences]. However, given Conrad’s key position in the debate, 
both inside and outside sociology and the attention we need to 
give to the issue of what should count as medical knowledge and 
definitions, his work provides a useful start point for discussion. 
The issue of medical knowledge and definitions has remained 
poorly explored in the literature that followed over recent dec-
ades, and therefore, I would argue, that misleading and biased 
interpretations of medical knowledge have been reproduced as 
the debate has grown and become more complex.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, I 
critique the way that medical knowledge has been understood 
in the concept of medicalization and argue for the importance 
of developing a different conceptual framework, which I term 
“knowledge-based.” This new framework allows different (non-
biomedical) branches of medical knowledge, irrespective of the 
political or scientific status of these branches in society, to be the 
basis for medicalization. Second, I explain the assumptions that 
underlie this approach by drawing on hermeneutic philosophy to 
argue that there is a stable concept of medicine on which to base an 
argument that apparently diverse forms of medical practice can be 
grouped together and used within the concept of medicalization. 
Then, I argue that medicalization is not unproblematically linked 
to medical social control. Third, I describe some operational steps 
for empirical studies using the knowledge-based approach to 
medicalization and its main implications for the wider sociologi-
cal debate. I end with a summary of the key arguments.
tHe pRoBleM
Medicalization first entered the vocabulary of social scientists 
(Pitts, 1968; Szasz, 1970) to address the “tendency [of] medical 
institutions to deal with non-conforming behavior” (Broom and 
Woodward, 1996, p. 358). The concept speaks to the influence 
and role of medical regulation in daily life, which replaced previ-
ous social control institutions, namely the church and the law, in 
the management of deviance as explanations for human health 
conditions gradually changed from sin, to crime, and eventually 
to sickness.
Sociological debates about medicalization have encoun-
tered several critiques. These include the issue of whether 
human conditions and behaviors are facing pressure for 
medicalization, or whether demedicalization or remedicali-
zation better describe contemporary trends (Conrad, 1977, 
1979, 1992, 2005, 2007; Lowenberg and Davis, 1994; Williams, 
2002, 2004; Conrad and Leiter, 2004; Adler and Adler, 2007; 
Torres, 2014); the durability of the concept in the context of 
societal transformations such as growing criticism and mobi-
lization against medical authority (Rose, 2007) and critiques 
of the theoretical assumptions in medicalization (e.g., some 
branches of social constructionism perceive the reference to 
medicalization as a reification of medical power and legiti-
macy Bury, 1986).
In a recent article by Busfield (2017), she re-examines these 
critiques and argues that medicalization remains as empirically 
and conceptually relevant in late modern society as ever as a 
consequence of medicine’s continuous influence in everyday 
life. Williams et al.’s (Williams et al., 2017) response to Busfield’s 
article agrees with her defense of medicalization but highlights 
problems in her approach to its definition, in particular the 
fact that the concept contains “elastic” categories that expand 
and contract over time, and that medicalization can occur on 
different levels (conceptual, institutional and interactional) 
(Williams et  al., 2017, p. 775–776). This debate highlights the 
extent to which definitions of medicalization continue to need 
further clarification. I note Peter Conrad’s claim that “the key to 
medicalization is definition” (Conrad, 2007, p. 5) and, therefore, 
I argue that it is useful to revisit the literature to reassess some 
of the grounding arguments on the emergence of medicalized 
societies and whether they continue to hold up in the context of 
pluralist and global societies.
Peter Conrad’s work on the medicalization of society suggests 
that medicalization happened in a relatively well circumscribed 
time and scope of medical knowledge: “The medical profession 
and the expansion of medical jurisdiction were prime movers 
for medicalization” (Conrad, 2007, p. 9); “[medicalization is] the 
result of intentional expansion by the medical profession” (Conrad, 
1992, p. 211); it involves “licensing the medical profession to 
provide some type of treatment for it [disease]” (Conrad, 1975, 
p. 12); it means that “human problems [enter] the jurisdiction 
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of the medical profession” (Conrad, 1992, p. 210); that “physi-
cians are most directly involved”; and that medical diagnosis 
and treatment are based on “prescribing drugs” (Conrad, 1992, 
p. 211). In short, the underlying assumption is that the emergence 
of medicalization is linked to the medical profession in the West, 
which is known to have developed out of a specific branch of 
knowledge built on biology and physiology, and closely supported 
by technological practices and evidence; hence its designation as 
biomedicine or biological medicine (Hofmann, 2001).
Given Conrad’s focus on the processes that Western societies 
underwent from the twentieth century onward with the extension 
of medicine’s domain, it is fair to say that his conceptualization of 
medicalization is empirically grounded. Nevertheless, Conrad’s 
own concern with the definition of medicalization raises an 
important and challenging issue. He argues that, “The interest 
in medicalization has predominantly focused on previously 
non-medical problems that have been medicalized, but actually 
medicalization must include all problems that come to be defined 
in medical terms” (Conrad, 1992, p. 211). This calls into question 
how to define “medical terms.” My argument is that defining 
medicalization as the process through which things are made 
medical requires a clear theoretical standpoint as to the defini-
tion of medical knowledge, and may be quite distinct from the 
empirical context that Conrad and others were studying.
If the distinction between empirical context and theoretical 
scope of medicalization are not properly acknowledged, as soci-
ologists we risk reproducing a misleading and culturally biased 
argument: that medicalization refers only to Western biomedical 
knowledge (see for instance Furedi, 2008 on medicalization 
in therapy culture). The reason I consider it misleading and 
culturally biased is because it is grounded on a profession-based 
view of medicine. For medicalization of society to exist medical 
knowledge had to be accepted, produced, and reproduced by 
players beyond medical professionals per se, such as regulatory 
institutions (e.g., legal, political, and educational), other health 
professions more closely related to biomedicine (e.g., nursing), 
lay knowledge, and other actors in health not entirely related to 
the medical profession (Conrad, 2007; Williams et al., 2017). It is 
necessary to acknowledge that what makes medical knowledge 
exist without the direct intervention of its practitioners is the 
institutionalization of medicine’s social control, and that this could 
only have taken place after medicine had undergone a process of 
professionalization. Here, I draw on neo-Weberian perspectives 
on the professions, which argue that professionalization is the 
result of closure processes in the access to education, credentials, 
and practice, which underpin the institutionalization of social 
control (Saks, 2015). Professionalization of medicine thus refers 
to the process in which, on the basis of laboratory-based knowl-
edge built on biology and physiology, control over non-clinicians 
and other branches of knowledge previously defined as medical 
was institutionalized. (I return to this issue below.)
Consequently, when the theoretical and empirical scopes of medi-
calization are not separated, the concept automatically reproduces 
the meaning, content, and position of medicine in Western countries. 
This can help explain much of the criticism toward medicalization, 
either for not being accurate in addressing the growing opposition 
to medical authority (Ballard and Elston, 2005) or for contributing 
to the legitimation of medical dominance (Rose, 2007). It also affects 
the understanding of concepts that resonate with the empirical-based 
view of medicine, such as biomedicalization (Clarke et al., 2010) and 
CAMization (Almeida, 2012). My reference to these concepts is not 
critical given that technoscientific structures and knowledge and 
growing battles for recognition by complementary and alternative 
medicines practitioners in health are undeniable transformations 
that contemporary societies are facing. The issue, in my view, is that 
concepts such as these should sit within a broader umbrella concept 
of medicalization and not discussed as “alternatives” (Busfield, 2017) 
or as “co-evolving processes” (Williams et al., 2017).
There are several criticisms of accepting what I have termed 
an empirically grounded view of medicalization. One criticism is 
that the notion of medicalization loses its adaptive dimension and 
is, therefore, essentialist in relation to the medical/non-medical 
boundary. Medicalization, demedicalization, and remedicaliza-
tion, therefore, mean human conditions and behaviors enter-
ing and leaving the realm of biomedical knowledge. Another 
criticism is that the concept becomes normative in relation to 
the different players and types of knowledge in health care. Not 
surprisingly, most empirical analyses of medicalization take 
place where Western biomedicine has been institutionalized as 
medicine. Emerging exemptions from the non-Western world 
similarly strengthen this link (e.g., Conrad and Bergey, 2014; 
Lahiri-Dutt, 2015). The expansion of laboratory medicine across 
the globe and of consumerism, informed societies, global-scale 
medical tourism, and the role of transcontinental regulatory 
agencies in health help to explain the growing acceptance of this 
overlap beyond the West (Conrad, 2007). A third criticism is that 
this view of medicalization is less accurate in understanding the 
complexity of processes, knowledge, and medical practices and 
operates as if medicine had started to influence everyday life only 
a century ago and only in Western countries. The influence of 
medicine in the Western world before the nineteenth century and 
outside the Western world (e.g., Ayurveda or traditional Chinese 
medicine) is clearly indicative of the fact that the theoretical 
scope of medicalization should not be linked exclusively to one 
specific branch of knowledge. Otherwise, the concept becomes 
yet another indication that the discussion in medical sociology 
has been narrowed to the specific development, institutions and 
knowledge structures in Western countries (Bradby, 2016).
tHe ReleVanCe oF a KnoWleDGe-
BaseD appRoaCH to MeDiCaliZation
It is justifiable and necessary to ask what “medical terms,” “language,” 
“framework,” and “interventions” medicalization actually refers 
to. Is it to medicine more broadly or biomedicine more specifi-
cally? In order to provide a clearer answer to this question, I argue 
that there is a need to introduce a knowledge-based approach to 
medicalization to replace the profession-based approach that is 
most common in the debate. The idea is to show, as suggested 
by Busfield (2017) and Williams et al. (2017), that the concept 
can be more analytical neutral in relation to different players and 
different forms of medical knowledge and therefore to prove its 
ongoing relevance in the current debate in medical sociology. The 
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expression “knowledge-based approach” means that the concept 
of medicalization must be broad enough to include the different 
branches of medical knowledge, irrespective of the political or 
scientific status of these branches in society.
In summary, there are three areas that I argue would enhance 
our understanding of the concept of medicalization. First, there 
is a need to acknowledge that the concept of medicalization com-
prises both theoretical and empirical scopes of analysis. Second, 
the theoretical scope of medicalization should be separated from 
empirical observations. This enables a critical exploration of vari-
ations in medicine in both time and space including the branches 
of knowledge defined as medical; the different degrees of social 
control linked to medical knowledge; the players allowed to 
exercise such control; and the procedures considered appropriate. 
Third, medicalization is inherently adaptive, as it is not specific to 
particular medical knowledge and players.
tWo unDeRlyinG assuMptions
The position I propose here is based on the separation of medi-
cine as a theoretical reality and medicine as an empirical reality. 
My argument is that this difference has not always been properly 
recognized in the debate on medicalization. There are at least two 
results. One is the difficulty in understanding the theoretical scope 
of medicalization in Conrad’s definition (making things medical) 
and the other is the idea that acceptance of medicalization reflects 
a normative defense of biomedical power.
My argument that these two scopes should be separated is 
defended on the basis of two assumptions. One is the ontological 
existence of medicine, i.e., in which we can find common traits 
in medical practice and knowledge in spite of the changes that 
medicine has undergone, especially since the eighteenth century. 
The other is the explanation that social control of medicine 
should be regarded as the result of a broader political process 
in societies. It is a process that explains the professionalization 
of medicine, which is why Conrad is right in saying that, from 
the most abstract point of view, medicalization precedes social 
control. My argument is, therefore, that, from an analytical 
point of view, medicalization and social control should remain 
separate. Any failure to separate these concepts analytically reifies 
the frontiers between what is considered medical or non-medical 
and is normative in relation to the other branches of knowledge 
excluded by political processes.
the ontology of Medicine
The first underlying assumption that I make is about medicine’s 
nature, its ontology. The argument is that whereas there are obvi-
ous differences in how medicine turns out empirically, sociology 
needs to acknowledge medicine’s founding principles and features 
that remain stable over time and in the different branches of 
knowledge. This has been so at least since Hippocrates, who is 
considered in modern Western countries to be the first practi-
tioner to have rationalized the etiology of diseases as treatable by 
natural means (e.g., Ferngren, 2009).
A philosophical exploration of medicine’s ontology is one 
way to theorize medicine apart from empirical observations. 
Furthermore, it allows us to address Conrad’s definition of 
medicalization as “defining a problem in medical terms, using 
medical language to describe a problem, adopting a medical 
framework to understand a problem, or using a medical interven-
tion to ‘treat’ it” (Conrad, 2007, p. 5).
According to an ontological view of medicine, its presence in 
society—medical knowledge, players, practices and procedures— 
should be looked at as the result of influences and disputes 
among the different branches of knowledge either in relation 
to each other or in relation to patients and regulation instances 
(e.g., Porter, 1989; McVaugh, 1993; Saks, 1996). This understand-
ing includes the time when medicine consisted of deregulated 
and not even necessarily related branches of knowledge and the 
divisions between them were blurred and adaptive among and 
within countries (e.g., Hippocrates’ humoralism, Galen’s physi-
ological system, Dioscorides’ use of herbs, Aristotle’s relationship 
with nature, practices labeled as magical, mythical, quackery, 
or witchcraft). Some examples described since the Middle Ages 
include maternal diseases; heart, liver, and nerve diseases; and 
aches, colds, and fevers (see Porter, 1995 and Walker, 2013 for a 
detailed description). It also includes the modern scope of labora-
tory medicine when medical knowledge in Western countries was 
first subject to large-scale regulation (Lindemann, 1999; Johnson 
and Chaudhry, 2012).
My view of medicine’s ontology builds on Gadamer’s (Gadamer, 
1996) hermeneutical philosophy. Medicine is defined as an “art” 
(from the Greek techne) in the sense that it uses discretionary-
based skills that are taught to turn abstract principles into 
concrete situations according to specific “truths” (from the Greek 
logos). Regardless of whether the truth stems from humoralism, 
morals, physics, chemistry, biology, or physiology, the produc-
tion of rationalized “work” (from the Greek ergon) encompasses 
all medical praxis. The main rationalization in medicine is the 
process of recovering health, given the overall understanding that 
practitioners’ intervention in the course of treatment or healing 
is at most partial. The factors out of the practitioners’ control 
include limited knowledge of the etiology of diseases, patients’ 
predisposition to be helped, and their trust in the procedures used 
(see Fox, 1957, 2000 or Montgomery, 2006 on some sociological 
adaptations of these arguments).
It could be argued that biomedicine lost this Aristotelian view 
of “work” in the light of positivist assumptions underpinning 
today’s scientific rationale. However, Gadamer (1996) makes clear 
that despite practitioners’ greater capacity to change the course 
of natural life through technical and technological intervention 
built on scientific evidence and methods (though even this capac-
ity is sometimes more rhetorical than effective), two features of 
modern and classical medical techne have remained unchanged. 
The first is the scope of praxis. Medical decisions continue as 
contingency-dependent as ever, even in the context of clinical 
protocols and guidelines. Think of the clinician’s eye, feelings, and 
experience in supporting medical decisions. How clinicians think 
and apply knowledge to concrete situations remains intrinsically 
discretionary and thus only partially controllable (Atkinson, 
1995; Timmermans, 2010, see also Kinsella and Pitman, 2012 
on the Aristotelian concept of phronesis as applied to modern 
professions). Think also of the contextually embedded nature 
of scientific knowledge [e.g., see Bourdieu (2004) on the effect 
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of school contexts on scientific learning or Lakatos (1968) on 
scientific communities].
The second feature is the aim of medical practice. Although 
the categories of health and disease and practitioner–patient 
interaction have changed profoundly over time, we should not 
disregard medicine’s judgment and quest for ordered explanations 
of health and disease as intrinsic to medical practice (Toulmin, 
1993; Downie and Macnaughton, 2000).
the link of Medicalization  
to social Control
The second underlying assumption has to do with reassessing the 
commonly accepted link of medicalization to social control. Social 
control is often regarded as part of medicalization (see among 
others Riessman, 1983 or Davis, 2006). Although this link is easy 
to understand in relation to biomedicine in Western countries, it 
could not be further from the theoretical scope of medicalization. 
Conrad himself stated, “On the most abstract level medical social 
control is the acceptance of a medical perspective as the dominant 
definition of a certain phenomenon” (Conrad, 1979, p. 511–512), 
thus “medicalization precedes medical social control” (Conrad, 
1992, p. 216).
When medicalization draws on biomedical knowledge this 
relationship is easily inverted, i.e., social control can precede 
medicalization. The inversion reflects the disputes involving 
practitioners of different forms of medical knowledge for 
clients and state legitimacy at the time when medical social 
control began to expand in society (Wailoo, 2004; Larson, 
2012). The historical literature seems to agree on two argu-
ments in this regard. One argument is that initial forms of 
medical social control date back to the late seventeenth 
century as part of the collectivization of everyday life events 
in which the functioning of nation-states exposed the human 
body to growing normalization, normativization, and morali-
zation (e.g., the rise of sanitary, preventive, and assistentialist 
medicine, see Foucault, 1979a,b; Armstrong, 1983; Lupton, 
1995). The other argument is that generally in Western coun-
tries disputes among different forms of medical knowledge 
(e.g., naturalism, humoralism, philosophy, and so on) formally 
ended only in the nineteenth and twentieth century [e.g., the 
UK Medical Act in 1858 and the US National Board of Medical 
Examiners in 1915, see Freidson (1970) and Johnson and 
Chaudhry (2012)]. In short, both arguments highlight that 
forms of medical social control took place before medicalized 
societies had been consolidated [e.g., the medicalization of 
prenatal care is said to have only taken place in the US in 1935, 
see Barker (1998)].
Drawing on the neo-Weberian social closure theory applied 
to professions, disputes among branches of medical knowledge 
and other health care practices are part of the process of the 
professionalization of medicine. From this standpoint, I argued 
that the overlap of medicalization and biomedicine entailed a 
profession-based approach to medicalization. Professionalization 
is the process of closure in which occupations succeed in self-
regulating both access to and the implementation of knowledge 
in accordance with specific rules and codes of conduct (Hughes, 
1958; Wilensky, 1964). As originally noted by Zola (1972), this 
control can only be effectively achieved after practitioners: 
(i) secure the content of their knowledge against other, competing 
knowledge and (ii) ensure the extensive political and legal protec-
tion of that knowledge.
The key issue in the acceptance of medicalization as overlap-
ping with the “bio paradigm” is that medical social control is not 
intrinsic to biomedical knowledge. Actually, the way in which 
medicine replaced the church and the law as a mechanism of 
social regulation is the result of the role nation-states in governing 
everyday life (Zola, 1972; Pinell, 2011). For this reason, Conrad 
is right to argue that medicalization is prior to medical social 
control. Things that are made medical exist in societies regardless 
of whether medicine exerts social control. For instance, the work 
by Weisz (2003) shows that medicine related differently to states, 
sometimes even at the same time, either in a close relationship 
(e.g., France) or more loosely (e.g., Britain) and that this has 
affected the levels of social control afforded to medicine. He also 
demonstrates that full adherence to biomedical epistemology 
and service ideals did not occur until after states had licensed 
medicine on a national scale.
What these arguments highlight is that biological medicine 
only institutionalized medical social control (the process usually 
referred to as the medicalization of society) after having success-
fully monopolized the truths of the medical field, thereby becom-
ing a profession. Therefore, medical social control emerged before 
the medical profession actually existed as such.
Therefore, what happened in Europe at the turn of the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century was not the rise of medi-
calization of society as one can assume by the overlap between 
medicalization and biological knowledge. Rather, it was the 
comprehensive institutionalization of medical social control 
through the professionalization of medicine (Porter, 1999). 
Medicalized conditions and problems existed before and will 
continue to exist irrespective of the degree and scope of medical 
control in societies.
soMe opeRational steps
My attempt to critique and clarify Conrad’s theoretical scope of 
medicalization (making things medical) builds on a philosophi-
cal definition of medicine that is independent from its empirical 
existence in context. The result is that the conceptualization of 
medicalization embraces several medicalizations, i.e., any branch 
of medical knowledge can medicalize life. Without acknowledg-
ing the plurality of medical knowledges, the sociological position 
is empirically biased and normative about the different branches 
of medical knowledge and reproduces the boundaries set by 
forms of medical knowledge that succeed in institutionalizing 
social control. My argument is not that, from an empirical point 
of view, medicalization and social control do not overlap, because 
it was precisely this that happened in the industrialized countries 
with the biomedical paradigm. The central point is that medicine 
has a theoretical (in additional to an empirical) existence and, 
therefore, the definition of what is and what is not medical cannot 
be bound by purely empirical processes.
The key operational steps required to use this knowledge-
based approach to medicalization are as follows. The first step 
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is to accept that the medicalization of human conditions and 
behaviors could result from activities within all branches of 
medical knowledge, regardless of their status and place in society. 
I have already discussed that the establishment of medical defini-
tions is deeply embedded in tensions and disputes among the dif-
ferent branches of knowledge and in their relations with states. 
Therefore, accepting an inclusive definition of medicalization is 
a key step. It also acknowledges the fact that when one branch 
of knowledge exerts social control over society as a whole, as is 
the case of biomedicine in the West, it does not prevent other 
branches from medicalizing behaviors and conditions as well, 
even if they do it partially or entirely outside the influence of 
nation-states.
My proposal to open medicalization to different medical 
knowledges carries the risk of an inaccurate definition of medicine, 
thus making it necessary to adopt a clear analytical standpoint 
that establishes clear boundaries of what is medical and what is 
not. Accordingly, the second step is the need to test the adherence 
of the different branches of knowledge to medicine’s ontological 
features (the scope of praxis and the aim of practice), according to 
which medicine can be defined as the use of discretionary-based 
skills that are taught to turn abstract principles into concrete 
situations according to specific truths aimed at health recovery 
(see the detailed explanation in the Section “The Ontology of 
Medicine”).
The third step is to make it clear in relation by what specific 
etiology human conditions and behaviors are labeled as medical. 
Acknowledging the form of medical knowledge used is essential 
to identify the type of medicalization that is being addressed 
(e.g., biology and physiology, humoralism, naturalism, philoso-
phy, morality, and so on), thereby making it possible to overcome 
the criticism that medicalization has too often become meaning-
less (Hofmann, 2016).
The fourth step is to find out how different medicalizations 
relate to each other, given that the content of medical knowledge 
is blurred and adaptive (Cant and Sharma, 1999; Shuval et al., 
2002), for example, users may absorb and use medical knowledge 
differently when they sit outside of biomedical jurisdiction and sci-
entifically tested procedures (Baer and Coulter, 2008; Quah, 2008).
The fifth step is to ascertain if and how the different branches 
of knowledge exert social control in societies. Halfmann (2012) 
has mentioned that specific players, discourses, practices, and 
identities integrate medical social control in society through 
specific processes and at different levels. While social control 
can be exerted at macro level in the legislation, rulings, reports, 
and debates of national and international organizations, such 
as government bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, corporations, 
markets, universities, journals, foundations, non-profit organiza-
tions, and the media, at meso level it can be exerted by mission 
statements, reports, advertising, and procedures in local and 
regional organizations such as workplaces, hospitals, medical 
groups, clinics, nursing homes, schools, social service agencies, 
and prisons; and at micro level in face-to-face interactions 
(see Halfmann, 2012 for a detailed description). Consequently, 
my argument here is that different forms of medical knowledge 
can relate to specific ways of exerting social control over human 
conditions and behaviors.
ContRiBution to tHe CuRRent 
DeBate on MeDiCaliZation
The standpoint of the knowledge-based approach to medicaliza-
tion calls into question the empirical-based view of medicine and 
medical boundaries, thus affecting specifically the widely accepted 
definition of medicalization by Peter Conrad and concepts like 
biomedicalization and CAMization, rather than other concepts 
such as pharmaceuticalization (Abraham, 2010). Nevertheless, 
I do not claim to oppose Conrad’s theories or biomedicalization 
and CAMization. My argument is that claims about the processes 
of medicalization, demedicalization, or remedicalization of 
human conditions and behaviors require the adoption of a clear 
understanding of what medicine is. This idea resonates with 
Conrad’s own concern with the definition of medicalization, 
which was under discussion again in Williams et al.’s (Williams 
et al., 2017) rejoinder to Busfield (2017). However, the way both 
contributions pose questions for future debate show the extent 
to which the overall understanding of medicalization remains, 
to a large extent, profession-based. The fact that biomedical 
knowledge started to govern daily life without the direct influ-
ence of its practitioners, thus contributing to the rise of medicine’s 
social control, is the greatest expression of medicine’s profession-
alization. For me a profession-based approach to medicalization 
results in the acceptance and reproduction of medical boundaries 
and definitions directly from biomedical knowledge. On the 
other hand, the standpoint of a knowledge-based approach 
adopts a view of medicine that considers its existence regardless 
of how it manifests empirically and acknowledges that medicine 
comprises different branches of knowledge whose boundaries are 
under constant adaptation.
If a knowledge-based view of medicalization is used, then both 
biomedicalization and CAMization actually articulate different 
forms of medicalization rather than alternatives to it. This is so 
because the knowledge and players often used to highlight alterna-
tives to medicalization actually share medicine’s ontological traits, 
thus proving the production of specific forms of medicalization 
(e.g., the concept of biomedicalization relates to medicalization 
by biological medicine and CAMization to medicalization by 
“complementary and alternative” medicines). A similar argument 
goes for those who argue that the medicalization of society is in 
decline. The role of midwives in homebirth is a good example used 
to support this position. In this case, I follow Busfield’s (Busfield, 
2017) arguments on the ongoing centrality of medicalization and 
say that opposition to medicalization is, at most, specific to bio-
medicine, whose effects may be harmless to other forms of medical 
knowledge. As Halfmann (2012) rightly argues, different branches 
of knowledge are able to exist and produce their own effects even 
when one specific branch of knowledge succeeds in monopolizing 
the institutionalization of medical social control over society.
ConCluDinG ReMaRKs: an oVeRVieW 
oF tHe Key aRGuMents
The application of a knowledge-based approach to medicalization 
seeks to represent a way for the concept to overcome some of 
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its criticism. Although several authors have sought to provide 
a comprehensive definition of medicalization, the fact that the 
medical/non-medical division is largely built on biomedical 
knowledge means that its conceptualization accepts and repro-
duces a view of medicine linked to the institutionalization of the 
medical profession. I have argued that such overlap of medicaliza-
tion with biomedical knowledge fails to acknowledge that many 
different forms of medical knowledge can medicalize aspects of 
life. I named this widely accepted definition of medicalization as 
profession-based in order to highlight that it has to do with the 
process of closure that biomedicine went through, as this allowed 
it to exclude other branches of knowledge from the medical 
domain and to ensure its reproduction in society in the absence 
of the direct influence of its practitioners.
My view is that this understanding ignores three issues that are 
key to a theoretical scope of medicalization. One is that problems 
defined in medical terms, using medical language or treated 
through medical intervention are not unique to Western profes-
sionalized medicine that is built on biology and physiology. The 
second issue is that people’s adherence to medical truths relies 
as much on the institutionalization of social control as on the 
perception of the effectiveness of treatments and cures. The third 
issue is that there are underlying features of clinicians’ praxis 
that have remained relatively stable in the history of medicine. 
This argument draws on hermeneutical philosophy and seeks to 
legitimize the detachment of medicalization from biomedicine. 
I referred to two core features of medicine’s ontology that apply to 
all medical branches: the scope of praxis and the aim of practice. 
As to the scope of praxis, medical decisions are intrinsically 
contingency-dependent. As to the aim of the practice, while the 
categories “health” and “disease” have changed drastically, the aim 
of medicine can be identified as the quest for ordered explana-
tions and intervention aimed at treatment or healing.
Consequently, I argue that medicalization cannot be conflated 
with social control because medicine and social control stem 
from analytically independent dimensions that may or may not 
overlap in societies. One dimension is the fact that problems 
become defined in medical terms, i.e., conditions that are 
“medicalized.” The other dimension is the process through which 
certain branches of medical knowledge institutionalize control 
over societies. While the former is specific to the medical realm, 
the second is specific to the government of societies. Detaching 
social control from medicalization protects Conrad’s argument 
that medicalization comprises the dynamics of medicalization, 
demedicalization, and remedicalization of human conditions. 
These dynamics reflect disputes for social control exerted by 
different players and medical knowledge and not the issue of 
medicalization itself.
Conrad is right to stand up for medicalization as describing 
a problem in medical terms, using medical language to describe 
a problem, adopting a medical framework to understand a 
problem, or using medical intervention to treat it. What my 
knowledge-based approach highlights is that the definition of 
medical terms, the use of medical language and application of 
medical frameworks and intervention to treatment has to include 
all branches of medicine and is independent from the institution-
alization of social control.
In short, the core aspect of the knowledge-based approach 
to medicalization is that it revisits the definition of medical 
knowledge and proposed one that is not normatively aligned 
to Western professional biomedicine. Consequently, it seeks to 
reconsider the ongoing debate of whether or not human condi-
tions and behaviors face demedicalization in Western countries 
and to open the concept beyond the West, where medicalized 
behaviors and conditions exist apart from the institutionalization 
of biomedical control (e.g., Ayurveda in India).
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